Rather than evoke images of a pretty bell-shaped flower, since 1999 the term Columbine triggers memories of an active school shooting involving two troubled Colorado high school students who killed 13 and wounded over 20 others before turning their weapons on themselves. While most people recall this tragedy as an active shooter event and Columbine is remembered as one of our nation’s first school shootings, there were multiple IEDs later found at and near the school. In fact, there were an estimated 99 of them. IRTB Instructor Joe Dempsey was the Bomb Squad Commander of one of the responding squads and shared insights from his experience.
The shooters, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, had a history of law breaking and reportedly were known to have previously set off bombs outside a pizza place. As part of their planning for the April 20, 1999 massacre, they not only illegally acquired shotguns, but they also collected explosives while working at a fireworks stand including pyrotechnic powder which they used to create IEDs commonly referred to as crickets that they later used throughout Columbine High School.
Journals kept by Harris and Klebold helped investigators understand their attack on the high school was intended to be similar to the Oklahoma City bombing. Their calculated plan included placing IEDs at a greenbelt area a few miles away from the school as a diversion for responders. They also placed IEDs in each of their vehicles timed to go off separately. The perpetrators entered the school with more IEDs in duffel bags that they left in the cafeteria. These IEDs contained 20 pound propane tanks which, if deployed successfully, would cause an explosion large enough to send students not already incapacitated outside where Harris and Klebold would be waiting with multiple weapons. The next part of the perpetrators’ plan involved returning to the inside of the school and continuing their violent spree and ultimately burning down the school while responders were subjected to vehicle IEDs. Their detailed plans provide insight on just how destructive their plot would have been if carried out successfully; diagrams of cafeteria tables, anticipated student counts, and a timed schedule to the minute reveal intended casualties numbering over 500 students.
The vehicle, diversionary, and cafeteria IEDs had alarm clocks set to detonate at various times. After placing the IEDs in the cafeteria, Harris and Klebold returned to their cars to wait for them to detonate. When the bombs failed to detonate, they dressed in trench coats and began shooting students near the entrance of the school, eventually entering the school and targeting students and teachers in the library.
Had the timed IEDs functioned as intended, student casualties would have been much higher and first responders addressing the incident certainly would have been harmed or killed. All of these IEDs were to be initiated by an Estes rocket motor using an electrical current. The timer for these IEDs was an alarm clock. None of the devices functioned as intended. As Dempsey explained, the perpetrators built the IEDs following a recipe involving an alarm clock as the timer and a model rocket motor from The Anarchist Cookbook. This recipe relied on 1940s technology including mechanical alarm clocks with metal bells and strikers. The model rocket motor used in Harris and Klebold’s design required a consistent amount of energy in order to fully ignite. In this case the alarm failed to provide this consistent energy.
While law enforcement surrounded the school and waited for SWAT, Harris and Klebold fired shots and dispersed cricket IEDs inside the school. It is important to keep in mind that active shooter tactics were not known at this time; in 1999 law enforcement protocol involved containing the situation and waiting for SWAT to arrive.
Harris and Klebold’s self-inflicted demise happened in the library shortly after noon. After opening fire from the library’s west windows on police outside, they turned their weapons on themselves. The bomb squad entered the school by approximately 4:30pm, and by the end of the day five SWAT teams searched the school.
While the explosive threats involved at Columbine are often forgotten, from this case there are valuable lessons regarding the importance for first responders to know the job responsibilities and capabilities of those with whom they may interact while responding to emergencies.
For instance, one lesson learned and change in protocol is that bomb techs are now incorporated within SWAT teams. During this incident, SWAT team members were operating around live IEDs, some of which were moved during the operation. Furthermore, as paramedics checked the bodies, a doctor came to the scene to verify the deaths. In the process, the doctor kicked a few live IEDs, which caused additional hazards for him and others around him because this could have initiated the devices. Medics are now incorporated into SWAT teams.
This incident also helped establish important post-incident search procedures. For instance, all of the students left backpacks on the floor of the school and each needed to be checked. The responding team discussed in advance the importance of marking each backpack after it was checked. All locker doors were left open after they, too were searched. Another valuable lesson learned was that first responders should not completely rely on bomb dogs; the bomb dogs used during this incident missed one of the timed IEDs that had been placed in the cafeteria.
From speaking with Dempsey, it is clear that although the event occurred over two decades ago, the details remain vivid. Reflecting on the scene, he mentions it is still hard to believe that two perpetrators were responsible for so much destruction. As Dempsey covers this case in the content he teaches, he focuses on the overall lesson learned that teamwork is key to successful response to events like these. While each individual role is important, it’s the integration of team members and their training that counts the most.
